It
is for this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges as
five compact little "groups" of demands, with the vital things
directly affecting Chinese sovereignty labelled desiderata, so
that Japanese ambassadors abroad could leave very warm assurances
at every Foreign Office that there was nothing in what Japan
desired which in any way conflicted with the Treaty rights of the
Powers in China. The air of mystery which surrounded the whole
business from the 18th January to the 7th May--the day of the
ultimatum--was due to the fact that Japan attempted to translate
the conspiracy into terms of ordinary intercourse, only to find
that in spite of the "filtering" the atmosphere of plotting could
not be shaken off or the political threat adequately hidden. There
is an arresting piece of psychology in this.
The conviction expressed in the first portion of the Memorandum
that bankruptcy was the rock on which the Peking administration
must sooner or later split, and that the moment which Japan must
seize is the outbreak of insurrections, is also highly instructive
in view of what happened later. Still more subtle is the manner in
which the ultimate solution is left open: it is consistently
admitted throughout the mass of reasoning that there is no means
of knowing whether suasion or force will ultimately be necessary.
Force, however, always beckons to Japan because that is the
simplest formula.
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