Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success. The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life." To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance." We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.
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