Cf. Bract., 315 b, Section 6 Fleta, II. c. 63, Section10,
p. 137. It was no doubt true, as Glanvill says, Lib. X. c. 17,
that the usual mode of proof was by a writing or by duel, and
that the King's Court did not generally give protection to private
agreements made anywhere except in the Court of the King (Lib. X.
c. 8). But it can hardly be that debts were never established by
witness in his time, in view of the continuous evidence from
Bracton onwards.
257/2 But cf. Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 399. I do not go so far as
to say that they were still a living institution. However that
may be, tradition must at least have modelled itself on what had
been the function of the former official body.
257/3 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6; Britt. (Nich.) I. p. 162;
Magna Charta, c. 38; Y.B. 21 Ed. I. 456; 7 Ed. II. 242;
18 Ed. II. 582; 3 Bl. Comm. 295, 344. Cf. 17 Ed. III. 48 b.
257/4 Cf. Glanv., Lib. IV. c. 6.
258/1 Lib. X. c. 18. It is possible that this means no more than
Glanvill's often repeated statement, that the King's Court did
not, generally speaking, take cognizance of private agreements.
The substantive law was, perhaps, still limited by traditions
from the infancy of contract. See pp. 248, 251, 259, 260. The
proposition in its broadest form may have been based on the
inability to try such agreements in any way but those which have
been specified.
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