Jermin, Cro. Eliz. 134; Chambers v. Taylor,
Cro. Eliz. 900.
115/3 32 Conn. 75, 89, 90.
116/1 Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII. 2 b, Pl. 2.
116/2 Keilway, 46 b.
116/3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339; L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-282; 4 H.&C. 263;
3 id. 774.
117/1 See Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 633, 634.
117/2 See Lecture I. p. 23 and n. 3.
117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136;
S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter
report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in
accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non
obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in
the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at
all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B.
N.S. 245.
118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.
118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v.
Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11,
pl. 10.
118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the
very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled.
118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.
118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co.
Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk.
Pages:
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517