It clearly does so in the passage before
us.
But the succession which admits a joinder of times is not
hereditary succession alone. In the passage which has been cited
Scaevola says that it may be by contract or purchase, as well as
by inheritance or will. It may be singular, as well as universal.
The jurists often mention antithetically universal successions
and those confined to a single specific thing. Ulpian says that a
man succeeds to another's place, whether his succession be
universal or to the single object. /1/
If further evidence were wanting for the present argument, it
would be found in another expression of Ulpian's. He speaks of
the benefit of joinder as derived from the persona of the
grantor. "He to whom a thing is granted shall have the benefit of
joinder from the persona of his grantor." /2/ A benefit cannot be
derived from a persona except by sustaining it.
It farther appears pretty plainly from Justinian's Institutes and
the Digest, that the benefit was not extended to purchasers in
all cases until a pretty late period. /3/
Savigny very nearly expressed the truth when he said, somewhat
broadly, that "every accessio, for whatever purpose, presupposes
nothing else than a relation of juridical [365] succession
between the previous and present possessor.
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