If A promises a barrel of flour to B,
and B promises him ten dollars for it, A means to have the ten
dollars for his flour, and B means to have the flour for his ten
dollars. If no time is set for either act, neither can call on
the other to perform without being ready at the same time
himself.
But this principle of equivalency is not the only principle to be
drawn even from the form of contracts, without considering their
subject-matter, and of course it is not offered as such in Mr.
Langdell's work.
Another very clear one is found in contracts for the sale or
lease of a thing, and the like. Here the qualities or
characteristics which the owner promises that the thing furnished
shall possess, go to describe the thing which the buyer promises
to accept. If any of the promised traits are wanting in the thing
tendered, the buyer may refuse to accept, not merely on the
ground that he has not [336] been offered the equivalent for
keeping his promise, but also on the ground that he never
promised to accept what is offered him. /1/ It has been seen
that, where the contract contains a statement touching the
condition of the thing at an earlier time than the moment for its
acceptance, the past condition may not always be held to enter
into the description of the thing to be accepted.
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