Of
course there is no such limit to the scope of their employment. A
contract may warrant the existence of other facts as well, and
examples of this kind probably might be found or imagined where
it would be clear that the only effect of the warranty was to
attach a condition to the contract, in favor of the other side,
and where the question would be avoided whether there was not
something more than a condition,--a repugnancy which prevented
the formation of any contract at all. But the preceding
illustrations are enough for the present purpose.
We may now pass from undertakings that certain facts are true at
the time of making the contract, to undertakings that certain
facts shall be true at some later time,--that is, to promises
properly so called. The question is when performance of the
promise on one side is a condition to the obligation of the
contract on the other. In practice, this question is apt to be
treated as identical with another, which, as has been shown
earlier, is a distinct point; namely, when performance on one
side is a condition of the right to call for performance on the
other. It is of course conceivable that a promise should be
limited to the case of performance of the things promised on the
other side, and yet that a failure of the latter should not
warrant a rescission of the contract.
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