But when words of description are
determined to be a warranty, the meaning of the decision is not
merely that the party using them binds himself to answer for
their truth, but that their truth is a condition of the contract.
For instance, in a leading case /1/ the agreement was that the
plaintiff's ship, then in the port of Amsterdam, should, with all
possible despatch, proceed direct to Newport, England, and there
load a cargo of coals for Hong Kong. At the date of the
charter-party the vessel was not in Amsterdam, but she arrived
there four days later. The plaintiff had notice that the
defendant considered time important. It was held that the
presence of the vessel in the port of Amsterdam at the date of
the contract was a condition, the breach of which entitled the
defendant to refuse to load, and to rescind the contract. If the
view were adopted that a condition must be a future event, and
that a promise purporting to be conditional on a past or present
event is either absolute or no promise at all, it would follow
that in this case the defendant had never made a promise. /2/ He
had only promised if circumstances existed which did not exist. I
have already stated my objections to this way of looking at such
cases, /2/ and will only add that the courts, so far as I am
aware, do not sanction it, and certainly did not in this
instance.
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