The Chief Justice therefore proceeded to distinguish between
[198] bailees for reward exercising a public employment, such as
common carriers, common hoymen, masters of ships, &c., and other
bailees; denied the rule in Southcote's Case as to the latter;
said that the principle of strict responsibility was confined to
the former class, and was applied to them on grounds of public
policy, and that factors were exonerated, not because they were
mere servants, as had always been laid down (among others, by
himself in arguing Morse v. Slue), but because they were not
within the reason of the rule.
The reader who has followed the argument so far, will hardly need
to be convinced that this did not mean the adoption of the
Praetor's Edict. There is further evidence at hand if required.
In the first place, as we have seen, there was a century of
precedents ending with Morse v. Slue, argued by Holt himself, in
which the liability of masters of ships, hoymen, carriers, &c.
had been adjudicated. Morse v. Slue is cited and relied on, and
there is no hint of dissatisfaction with the other cases. On the
contrary, they furnished the examples of bailees for reward
exercising a public calling. The distinction between bailees for
reward and others is Chief Justice Popham's; the latter
qualification (exercising a public calling) was also English, as
has partly appeared already, and as will be explained further on.
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