Generally speaking, the choice will be found to have
extended further than a simple act, and to co-ordinated acts into
conduct. Very commonly it will have extended further still, to
some external consequence. But generally, also, it will be found
to have stopped short of the consequence complained of.
The question in each case is whether the actual choice, or, in
other words, the actually contemplated result, was near enough to
the remoter result complained of to throw the peril of it upon
the actor.
[160] Many of the cases which have been put thus far are cases
where the proximate cause of the loss was intended to be produced
by the defendant. But it will be seen that the same result may be
caused by a choice at different points. For instance, a man is
sued for having caused his neighbor's house to burn down. The
simplest case is, that he actually intended to burn it down. If
so, the length of the chain of physical causes intervening is of
no importance, and has no bearing on the case.
But the choice may have stopped one step farther back. The
defendant may have intended to light a fire on his own land, and
may not have intended to burn the house. Then the nature of the
intervening and concomitant physical causes becomes of the
highest importance.
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