As to wrongs called malicious or intentional it is not necessary
to mention the different classes a second time, and to find them
a place in this series. As has been seen, they vary in the number
of circumstances which must be known. Slander is conduct which is
very generally at the risk of [159] the speaker, because, as
charges of the kind with which it deals are manifestly
detrimental, the questions which practically arise for the most
part concern the defence of truth or privilege. Deceit requires
more, but still simple facts. Statements do not threaten the harm
in question unless they are made under such circumstances as to
naturally lead to action, and are made on insufficient grounds.
It is not, however, without significance, that certain wrongs are
described in language importing intent. The harm in such cases is
most frequently done intentionally, if intent to cause a certain
harm is shown, there need to prove knowledge of facts which made
it that harm would follow. Moreover, it is often much easier to
prove intent directly, than to prove the knowledge which would
make it unnecessary.
The cases in which a man is treated as the responsible cause of a
given harm, on the one hand, extend beyond those in which his
conduct was chosen in actual contemplation of that result, and in
which, therefore, he may be to have chosen to cause that harm;
and, on the other hand, they do not extend to all instances where
the damages would not have happened but for some remote election
his part.
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