Hence, it may very properly be held that a
man who does such a thing does it at his peril, and that, if
damage ensues, he is answerable for it. The co-ordinated acts
necessary to point a gun and pull a trigger, and the intent and
knowledge shown by the co-ordination of those acts, are all
consistent with entire blamelessness. They threaten harm to no
one without further facts. But the one additional circumstance of
a man in the line and within range of the piece makes the conduct
manifestly dangerous to any one who knows the fact. There is no
longer any need to refer to the prudent man, or general
experience. The facts have taught their lesson, and have
generated a concrete and external rule of liability. He who snaps
a cap upon a gun pointed in the direction of another person,
known by him to be present, is answerable for the consequences.
The question what a prudent man would do under given
circumstances is then equivalent to the question what are the
teachings of experience as to the dangerous character of this or
that conduct under these or those circumstances; and as the
teachings of experience are matters of fact, it is easy to see
why the jury should be consulted with regard to them. They are,
however, facts of a special and peculiar function.
Pages:
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201