With regard to the intent necessary to deceit, we need not stop
with the single instance which has been given. The law goes no
farther than to require proof either of the intent, or that the
other party was justified in inferring such intention. So that
the whole meaning of the requirement is, that the natural and
manifest tendency of the representation, under the known
circumstances, must have been to induce the opinion that it was
made with a view to action, and so to induce action on the faith
of it. The standard of what is called intent is thus really an
external standard of conduct under the known circumstances, and
the analysis of the criminal law holds good here.
Nor is this all. The law pursuing its course of specification, as
explained in the last Lecture, decides what is the tendency of
representations in certain cases,--as, for instance, that a horse
is sound at the time of making a [135] sale; or, in general, of
any statement of fact which it is known the other party intends
to rely on. Beyond these scientific rules lies the vague realm of
the jury.
The other moral element in deceit is knowledge that the statement
was false. With this I am not strictly concerned, because all
that is necessary is accomplished when the elements of risk are
reduced to action and knowledge.
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