Now, what is the party's conduct
here. It consists in uttering certain words, [133] so ordered
that the utterance of them imports a knowledge of the meaning
which they would convey if heard. But that conduct with only that
knowledge is neither moral nor immoral. Go one step further, and
add the knowledge of another's presence within hearing, still the
act has no determinate character. The elements which make it
immoral are the knowledge that the statement is false, and the
intent that it shall be acted on.
The principal question then is, whether this intent can be
reduced to the same terms as it has been in other cases. There is
no difficulty in the answer. It is perfectly clear that the
intent that a false representation should be acted on would be
conclusively established by proof that the defendant knew that
the other party intended to act upon it. If the defendant foresaw
the consequence of his acts, he is chargeable, whether his motive
was a desire to induce the other party to act, or simply an
unwillingness for private reasons to state the truth. If the
defendant knew a present fact (the other party's intent), which,
according to common experience, made it likely that his act would
have the harmful consequence, he is chargeable, whether he in
fact foresaw the consequence or not.
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