/1/ So it was said that, if a man be driving cattle
through a town, and one of them goes into another man's house,
and he follows him, trespass does not lie for this. /2/ So it was
said by Doderidge, J., in the same case, that if deer come into
my land out of the forest, and I chase them with dogs, it is
excuse enough for me to wind my horn to recall the dogs, because
by this the warden of the forest has notice that a deer is being
chased. /3/
The very case of Mason v. Keeling, /4/ which is referred to in
the first Lecture for its echo of primitive notions, shows that
the working rules of the law had long been founded on good sense.
With regard to animals not then treated as property, which in the
main were the wilder animals, the law was settled that, "if they
are of a tame nature, there must be notice of the ill quality;
and the law takes notice, that a dog is not of a fierce nature,
but rather the contrary." /5/ If the animals "are such as are
naturally [119] mischievous in their kind, he shall answer for
hurt done by them, without any notice." /1/ The latter principle
has been applied to the case of a bear, /2/ and amply accounts
for the liability of the owner of such animals as horses and oxen
in respect of trespasses upon land, although, as has been seen,
it was at one time thought to stand upon his ownership.
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