It is undoubtedly possible that those who have
the making of the law should deem it wise to put the mark higher
in some cases than the point established by common practice at
which blameworthiness begins. For instance, in Morris v. Platt,
/2/ the court, while declaring in the strongest terms that, in
general, [116] negligence is the foundation of liability for
accidental trespasses, nevertheless hints that, if a decision of
the point were necessary, it might hold a defendant to a stricter
rule where the damage was caused by a pistol, in view of the
danger to the public of the growing habit of carrying deadly
weapons. Again, it might well seem that to enter a man's house
for the purpose of carrying a present, or inquiring after his
health when he was ill, was a harmless and rather praiseworthy
act, although crossing the owner's boundary was intentional. It
is not supposed that an action would lie at the present day for
such a cause, unless the defendant had been forbidden the house.
Yet in the time of Henry VIII. it was said to be actionable if
without license, "for then under that color my enemy might be in
my house and kill me." /1/ There is a clear case where public
policy establishes a standard of overt acts without regard to
fault in any sense.
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