But while this
notion has been [80] entertained, the extreme opposite will be
found to have been a far more popular opinion;--I mean the notion
that a man is answerable for all the consequences of his acts,
or, in other words, that he acts at his peril always, and wholly
irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.
To test the former opinion it would be natural to take up
successively the several words, such as negligence and intent,
which in the language of morals designate various well-understood
states of mind, and to show their significance in the law. To
test the latter, it would perhaps be more convenient to consider
it under the head of the several forms of action. So many of our
authorities are decisions under one or another of these forms,
that it will not be safe to neglect them, at least in the first
instance; and a compromise between the two modes of approaching
the subject may be reached by beginning with the action of
trespass and the notion of negligence together, leaving wrongs
which are defined as intentional for the next Lecture.
Trespass lies for unintentional, as well as for intended wrongs.
Any wrongful and direct application of force is redressed by that
action. It therefore affords a fair field for a discussion of the
general principles of liability for unintentional wrongs at
common law.
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