It has been argued that an actual intent is all
that can give the act a criminal character in such instances. /1/
But if the views which I have advanced as to murder and
manslaughter are sound, the same principles ought logically to
determine the criminality of acts in general. Acts should be
judged by their tendency under the known circumstances, not by
the actual intent which accompanies them.
It may be true that in the region of attempts, as elsewhere, the
law began with cases of actual intent, as those cases are the
most obvious ones. But it cannot stop with them, unless it
attaches more importance to the etymological meaning of the word
attempt than to the general principles of punishment. Accordingly
there is at least color of authority for the proposition that an
act is punishable as an attempt, if, supposing it to have
produced its natural and probable effect, it would have amounted
to a substantive crime. /2/
But such acts are not the only punishable attempts. There is
another class in which actual intent is clearly necessary, and
the existence of this class as well as the name (attempt) no
doubt tends to affect the whole doctrine. Some acts may be
attempts or misdemeanors which [67] could not have effected the
crime unless followed by other acts on the part of the
wrong-doer.
Pages:
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98