When we remember that
arson was the subject of one of the old appeals which take us far
back into the early law, /2/ we may readily understand that only
intentional burnings were redressed in that way. /3/ The appeal
of arson was brother to the appeal de pace et plagis. As the
latter was founded on a warlike assault, the former supposed a
house-firing for robbery or revenge, /4/ such as that by which
Njal perished in the Icelandic Saga. But this crime seems to have
had the same history as others. As soon as intent is admitted to
be sufficient, the law is on the high-road to an external
standard. A man who intentionally sets fire to his own house,
which is so near to other houses that the fire will manifestly
endanger them, is guilty of arson if one of the other houses is
burned in consequence. /5/ In this case, an act which would not
[65] have been arson, taking only its immediate consequences into
account, becomes arson by reason of more remote consequences
which were manifestly likely to follow, whether they were
actually intended or not. If that may be the effect of setting
fire to things which a man has a right to burn, so far as they
alone are concerned, why, on principle, should it not be the
effect of any other act which is equally likely under the
surrounding circumstances to cause the same harm.
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