So far, then, as criminal liability is
founded upon wrong-doing in any sense, and so far as the threats
and punishments of the law are intended to deter men from
bringing about various harmful results, they must be confined to
cases where circumstances making the conduct dangerous were
known.
Still, in a more limited way, the same principle applies to
knowledge that applies to foresight. It is enough that such
circumstances were actually known as would have led a man of
common understanding to infer from them the rest of the group
making up the present state of things. For instance, if a workman
on a house-top at mid-day knows that the space below him is a
street in a great city, he knows facts from which a man of common
understanding would infer that there were people passing below.
He is therefore bound to draw that inference, or, in other words,
is chargeable with knowledge of that fact also, whether he draws
the inference or not. If then, he throws down a heavy beam into
the street, he does an act [56] which a person of ordinary
prudence would foresee is likely to cause death, or grievous
bodily harm, and he is dealt with as if he foresaw it, whether he
does so in fact or not. If a death is caused by the act, he is
guilty of murder.
Pages:
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85