To understand their scope fully, to know how
they will be dealt with by judges trained in the past which the
law embodies, we must ourselves know something of that past. The
history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of
what the law is.
Again, the process which I have described has involved the
attempt to follow precedents, as well as to give a good reason
for them. When we find that in large and important branches of
the law the various grounds of policy on which the various rules
have been justified are later inventions to account for what are
in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a right to
reconsider the popular reasons, and, taking a broader view of the
field, to decide anew whether those reasons are satisfactory.
They may be, notwithstanding the manner of their appearance. If
truth were not often suggested by error, if old implements could
not be adjusted to new uses, human progress would be slow. But
scrutiny and revision are justified.
But none of the foregoing considerations, nor the purpose of
showing the materials for anthropology contained in the history
of the law, are the immediate object here. My aim and purpose
have been to show that the various forms of liability known to
modern law spring from the common ground of revenge.
Pages:
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63