Demosthenes saw at once that, before any progress could be made with
the siege of Syracuse, it was necessary to gain possession of the
counterwall, and confine the Syracusans within the limits of their
city. The sooner he made the attempt, the greater was his chance of
success; for every day wasted would give new confidence to the enemy,
and the condition in which he found the troops of Nicias was a visible
warning against the fatal consequences of delay. An attack made on the
cross-wall from its southern side ended in total failure; his siege-
engines were burnt, and the storming-parties repulsed at every point.
The only course which remained was to march round to the north-western
extremity of the plateau, carry the fort of Euryelus, and assail the
Syracusans within their own lines. After consulting with his
colleagues, Demosthenes determined to try the hazardous method of a
night-attack, hoping thus to take the garrison on Euryelus by
surprise. He himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the command,
and the whole Athenian army was engaged in the adventure, except those
who remained behind with Nicias to guard the camp. On a moonlight
night in August, at the hour of the first watch, the march began.
Moving cautiously up the valley of the Anapus, they turned the
northern end of the hill, and reached the path by which Lamachus had
ascended in the spring of the previous year.
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