Morality as the organization of human interests.
The worth of morality is most commonly defended today, in biological
terms, by describing it as a synthesis of human interests; it is
valuable because it is what we really want and need. It does, indeed,
forbid the carrying-out of any impulse which renders impossible greater
goods; it flatly opposes that unrestrained satisfying of a part of
our natures which we call self-indulgence, or of one nature at the
expense of others which we call selfishness. But it stifles desire
only for a greater ultimate good; it rejects that needless repression
of a part of the self which we call asceticism, and an undue
subordination of self to others. It is, then the organizing or
harmonizing principle, subordinating the interests of each aspect of
the self, and of the many conflicting selves, to the total welfare
of the individual and of the community. As Plato pointed out, [Footnote:
Republic, books. I-IV; e.g. (444): "Is not the creation of righteousness
the creation of a natural order and government of one another in the
parts of the soul, and the creation of unrighteousness the opposite?"
and (352): "Is not unrighteousness equally suicidal when existing in
an individual [as it is when it exists in the State], rendering him
incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, making
him an enemy to himself?" and (443): "The righteous man does not permit
the several elements within him to meddle with one another, or any
of them to do the work of others; but he sets in order his own inner
life, and is his own master, and at peace with himself; and when .
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