XIV. J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chap.
vi. H. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, book I, chap, III; book II,
chaps, I, II. W. Fite, Introductory Study of Ethics, part I. G. E.
Moore, Ethics, chap. VII. In rebuttal of some of these arguments: J.
S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chaps, II and IV. H. Spencer, Data of Ethics,
chaps, IX, X. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. X.
CHAPTER XIII
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
AFTER this summary answer to the commoner objections to our account
of morality, we should notice a few of the more persistently recurrent
formulas that seem inconsistent with this explanation of its
fundamental nature.
Is morality "categorical," beyond need of justification?
To Kant and his followers, as well as to many less philosophical minds,
the justification of morality by its utility has seemed unworthy.
Morality is much more ultimate and imperious. The pursuit of happiness
is not binding; morality is. The way to attain happiness is dubious
and variable; the commandments of morality are clear-cut and certain.
Different people find happiness in different activities; the laws of
morality are universal and changeless. Morality, therefore, is prior
to the pursuit of happiness; its dictates are known by an independent
faculty. There is in us all an unanalyzable and unavoidable "ought";
ours not to reason why; ours but to do-and die, if need be. Morality
is not a means to employ IF we wish happiness; in that case its precepts
would be but hypothetical, if you wish happiness, do so and so.
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