" Protarchus hits the
nail on the head by replying, "No one would call pleasures bad because
they are 'false,' but BY RASON OF SOME OTHER GREAT EVIL TO WHICH THEY
ARE LIABLE," i.e, because of their after-effects.] Who would wish,
however miserable, to exchange places with it! Are there not other
things to be considered besides happiness? "It is better to be a Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." And why? In the first place, we
suspect that the oyster's, or even the fool's, range of happiness is
very limited. We should hesitate to forego such joys as we do have,
even if sorrow attends them, at so great a sacrifice. In the second
place, each of us has a deep-rooted love of his own personal memories
and expectations; and except in cases of unusual depression of spirits
few of us would wish to lose our identity and become some other person
or thing even if we knew that other being to be happier. In the third
place, a man knows HE could NOT be happier as an oyster; an oyster's
joys (whatever they may be) would not satisfy him; he has other needs
and desires. He must find happiness, if at all, in the satisfaction
of his human cravings. The oyster's life, however satisfactory to the
oyster, would leave him restless and bored. If you are a Socrates,
you realize similarly that you could not FIND satisfaction in the fool's
life. You know that although you have sorrows the fool wots not of,
you also have a whole range of joys beyond his ken; and those joys
are particularly precious to you.
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