H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, XI-XIV. R. B. Perry, Moral Economy,
chap, II, secs, IV, V.; chap, III, secs, V, VI. F. Paulsen, System
of Ethics, book II, chap. I, sec. 6; chap, VI; book III, chap, X, sec.
1. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap, XVIII, sec. e. W. K. Clifford, Right
and Wrong, On the Scientific Basis of Morals, in Lectures and Essays,
vol. II. R. M. McConnell, Duty of Altruism. B. Russell, Philosophical
Essays, chap. I, sec. V. J. Royce, Problem of Christianity, vol. I,
chap. III.
CHAPTER XII
OBJECTIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS
HAVING now outlined the eudfemonistic account of morality, we may
note certain objections that are commonly raised to it, and certain is
understandings that constantly recur.
Do men always act for pleasure or to avoid pain?
Many of the earlier theorists, not content with showing that the good
consists ultimately in a quality of conscious states, asserted that
all of men's actions are actually DIRECTED TOWARD the attainment of
agreeable states of experience or avoidance of disagreeable states.
There is no act but is aimed for pleasure of some sort or away from
pain; men differ, then, only in their wisdom in selecting the more
important pleasures and their skill in attaining what they aim for.
This assertion, easily refuted, has seemed to some opponents of the
eudemonistic account of morality so bound up with it as to involve
its downfall.
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