It is fairer for
him to pay for the damage than for the owner of the flower- bed to
suffer the loss; such risks must be assumed as a part of the business
of keeping cows.
(3) If he was ignorant of the necessary height or strength of wall,
we blame him more. He has no business-keeping cows until he knows all
aspects of the business.
(4) If there was a gap in the wall which he would have noticed if he
had taken ordinary care, we hold him still further to blame, and his
punishment must be severer.
(5) If he remembered the gap in the wall and did not take the trouble
to repair it, thereby consenting to the damage his cows might do, his
case is still worse.
(6) Finally, if he deliberately turned the cows into his field with
the hope that they would go through the gap and damage his neighbor's
flower-beds, he is the most dangerous type of criminal, of "malice
aforethought," and his punishment must be severest of all.
In such ways do we distinguish between traits of character more and
more dangerous to society, and adjust our blame and punishment to their
different degrees of danger, and the differing degrees of efficacy
that the blame and punishment may have. But throughout these are purely
utilitarian, an unhappy necessity for the preservation of human
welfare.
On goodness of character: Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap. XII. F.
Paulsen, System of Ethics, book II, chap, I, secs. 3, 5. Leslie
Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap.
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