What, then, is the rationale of these
emotion-reactions?
Obviously, the same natural forces which have produced morality have,
pari passu, produced these emotions; they are one of the great means
by which men have been pushed into being moral. We praise people,
ultimately, because it is socially useful to praise them; the
approbation of one's fellows is one of the greatest possible incentives
to right conduct. We blame people that they and others may be thereby
deterred from wrongdoing. For ages these emotions have been arising
in men's hearts, veering their fellows toward moral action. Neither
blamer nor blamed has realized the purpose nature may be said to have
had in view; the emotional reaction has been instinctive, like sneezing.
But if it had not been for its eminent usefulness it would never have
developed and become so deep-rooted in us. If blame did no good, if
it did not tend to correct evildoing, it would be an unhappy and
undesirable state of mind, to be weeded out, like malice or
discouragement. Praise might be kept for its intrinsic worth, its
agreeableness, like sweet odors and pleasant colors. But actually we
need to conserve these reactions for their extrinsic value, as spurs
and correctives.
The man who acts upon a calculated expectation of consequences
is, indeed, to be praised, if the ends he has sought are good and his
calculation correct. Prudence, foresight, thoughtfulness are among
the most important virtues.
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