III. (20:8) In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass
those referred to what we conceive in a confused and
fragmentary manner ([vii] ).
IV. (20:9) In the number of causes whereby those modifications
(Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are
fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
things or to God ([ix] , [xi] ).
V. (20:10) Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange
and associate, one with another, its own emotions ([x] Note
and [xii] , [xiii] , [xiv] ).
(20:11) But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may
be better understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions
are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the
emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another
by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of
the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or
stirred by one emotion than by another. (12) For the strength of every
emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an
external cause. (13) Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge
only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of
knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be
characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities:
on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made
up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate
ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity.
Pages:
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350