Prop. [VII] Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason,
if we take account of time, are stronger than
those, which are attributable to particular objects
that we regard as absent.
Proof.- (7:1) We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion
wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by
another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II:[xvii] ).
(2) Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard
as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities
and power (IV:[vi] ), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some
sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV:[ix] ). (3) But an emotion which springs from reason
is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the def.
of reason in II:[xl] Note. ii.), which we always regard as present (for
there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we
always conceive in the same manner (II:[xxxviii] ). (7:4) Wherefore an
emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently ([A.i] )
emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their
external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the emotion which
springs from reason is more powerful.
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