i.
and second proof). (8) In like manner all appetites or desires are only
passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results
are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate
ideas. (4:9) For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given
action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas
(IV:[lix] ). (10) Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the
point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof,
nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. (4:11) For
the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming, adequate
ideas, as we have shown above (III:[iii] ).
Prop. [V] An emotion towards a thing, which we
conceive simply, and not as necessary,
or as contingent, or as possible, is,
other conditions being equal, greater
than any other emotion.
Proof.- (5:1) An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free,
is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III:[xlix] ),
and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as
possible, or contingent (IV:[xi] ). (2) But to conceive a thing as free
can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance
of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II:[xxxv] Note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other
conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is
necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest
of all.
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