(7) Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended
absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them.
(Prf:8) But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of
experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight
practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: and this
someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly)
of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog. (9) For
by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should
become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running
after hares. (10) To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.
(Prf:11) For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united
to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the
pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the
movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects,
and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in
various ways. (Prf:12) He asserted, that this gland is so suspended
in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest
motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended
in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks
are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects
which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if
the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has
already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one
way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving
and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed
before by a similar position of the gland.
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