(73:7) Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as
they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions,
which I have mentioned above. (8) Thus he endeavours, as we said
before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way
rejoicing. (9) How far human virtue is capable of attaining to
such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the
following Part.
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[APPENDIX]
What I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not
been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been
set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most
readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to
rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.
[Ap.I] (Ap1:1) All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity
of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone,
as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of
nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without
other individuals.
[Ap.II] (Ap2:1) Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
that they can be understood through it alone, are those which
are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived
to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
inadequately, and their force and increase are generally
defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things
external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions,
the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power,
the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary
knowledge.
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