Prop. [XXXIII] Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
assailed by those emotions, which are passions,
or passive states; and to this extent one and the
same man is variable and inconstant.
Proof.- (33:1) The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained
solely through our essence or nature (III:[D.i] & III:[Dii] ), but it
must be defined by the power, that is (III:[vii] ), by the nature of
external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there
are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby
we are affected (III:[lvi] ), and that men may be differently affected
by one and the same object (III:[li] ), and to this extent differ in
nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected
towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant.
Q.E.D.
Prop. [XXXIV] In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
passions, they can be contrary one to another.
Proof.- (34:1) A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that
which Paul hates (III:[xvi] ), or because Peter has sole possession
of a thing which Paul also loves (III:[xxxii] & Note), or for other
causes (of which the chief are enumerated in III:[lv] Note) ; it may
therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter (III:[De.
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