(4) For, in so far as it is not in
harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be different therefrom or
contrary thereto. (5) If different, it can neither be good nor bad
([xxix] ); if contrary, it will be contrary to that which is in harmony
with our nature, that is, contrary to what is good - in short, bad.
(31:6) Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in
harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as
it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XXXII] In so far as men are a prey to passion,
they cannot, in that respect, be said
to be naturally in harmony.
Proof. (32:1) Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
understood to agree in power (III:[vii] ), not in want of power or
negation, and consequently not in passion (III:[iii] Note); wherefore
men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said
to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.
Note.- (32:2) This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and
black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm
that the do not agree in any respect. (3) So, if we say that a man and
a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite - wanting in power,
not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly,
indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes - we should
certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike;
therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which
neither possess, really agree in no respect.
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