(4) No one, I say, from the necessity of his
own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes,
shrinks from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done in a
variety of ways. (5) A man, for instance, kills himself under the
compulsion of another man, who twists round his right hand, wherewith
he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces him to turn the blade
against his own heart; or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca,
by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins - that is, to escape a
greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes
may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea cannot
exist in the mind (III:[x] ) (20:6) But that a man, from the necessity
of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is as
impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone
will see for himself, after a little reflection.
Prop. [XXI] No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly,
and to live rightly, without at the same time
wishing to be, act, and to live - in other words,
to actually exist.
Proof.- (21:1) The proof of this proposition, or rather the propositio
itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire.
(21:2) For the desire of living, acting, &C.
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