ii] ); consequently (III:[vii] ) its force and increase can be
defined solely by human power. (3) Again, the desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said
emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be
defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with
our own power, indefinitely surpass it ([iii] ); hence the desires arising
from like emotions may be more vehement, than the desire which arises from
a true knowledge of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or
quench it. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XVI] Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
in so far as such knowledge regards what is future,
may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the
desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.
Proof.- (16:1) Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present ([ix] Coroll.).
(2) But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil,
though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can
be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop.,
the proof whereof is of universal application). (3) Wherefore desire
arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be
more easily controlled or quenched, &c.
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