). (3) Therefore ([ix] ) an emotion towards a thing contingent,
which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter, other
conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XIV] A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far
as it is considered as an emotion.
Proof.- (14:1) An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms
of its body a greater or less force of existing than before (by
[GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS]); therefore it has no positive
quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true;
consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of
being true, restrain any emotion. (2) But, in so far as such
knowledge is an emotion ([viii] ) if it have more strength for
restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain
the given emotion. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XV] Desire arising from the knowledge of good and
bad can be quenched or checked by many of the
other desires arising from the emotions whereby
we are assailed.
Proof.- (15:1) From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so
far as it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (III:[De.i] ),
the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion
wherefrom it arises (III:xxvii] ). (2) But, inasmuch as this desire
arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything,
it follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active
(III:[i] ), and must therefore be understood through our essence only
(III:[D.
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