Q.E.D.
Corollary.- (12:3) An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
Proof.- (12:4) Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future
([ix] Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time be
conceived as far distant from the present ([x] ). (5) Therefore an
emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to be
far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the
thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we
conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing,
which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived
the thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XIII] Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not
to exist in the present, is, other conditions being
equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.
Proof.- (13:1) In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we
not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
existence of the said thing ([D.iii] ), but, on the other hand
(by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its present
existence. (2) But, in so far as we conceive it in relation to
time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II:[xviii]
& Note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II:[xvii]
Coroll.
Pages:
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256