Prop. [XI] An emotion towards that which we conceive as
necessary is, when other conditions are equal,
more intense than an emotion towards that which
impossible, or contingent, or non-necessary.
Proof.- (11:1) In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a
thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary
(I:[xxxiii] note i.); wherefore ([ix] ) an emotion towards that which
is necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an
emotion that which is non-necessary. Q.E.D.
Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
exist at the present time, and which we conceive
as possible, is more intense, other conditions
being equal, than an emotion towards a thing
contingent.
Proof.- (12:1) In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
affected by the conception of some further thing, which would assert
the existence of the former ([D.iii] ); but, on the other hand, we (by
hypothesis) conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence.
(2) But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future,
we there by conceive things which assert its existence ([iv] ), that is
(III:[xviii] ), things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an
emotion towards something possible is more vehement.
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