Corollary.- (9:5) The image of something past or future, that is, of a
thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the
exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker
than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards
what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal,
than an emotion felt towards something present.
Prop. [X] Towards something future, which we conceive as close
at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we
conceive that its time for existence is separated from
the present by a longer interval; so too by the
remembrance of what we conceive to have not long
passed away we are affected more intensely, than if
we conceive that it has long passed away.
Proof.- (10:1) In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of
the object less, than if its period of future existence were more
distant from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is
obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more
intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- (10:2) From the remarks made in [D.vi] of this part it follows
that, if objects are
separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in
conception, though their
dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they all affect
us equally faintly.
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