I] By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
[D.II] By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms
see the foregoing preface towards the end.)
[D.III] Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
regarding nothing therein, which necessarily asserts
their existence or excludes it.
[D.IV] Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding
the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether
such causes be determined for producing them.
(In I:[xxxiii] note.i., I drew no distinction between possible
that place no need to distinguish them accurately.)
[D.V] By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
different directions, though they are of the same kind, such
as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and
are contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
[D.VI] What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present,
III:[xviii] notes.i., & ii., which see.
(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite
limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two
hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are
exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an
equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also
objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from
the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly
conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present,
and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.
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