, we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect,
not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or because Nature has
blundered. (Prf:26) For nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature,
save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient
cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its
efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.
(Prf:27) As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality
in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or
notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another.
(28) Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and
indifferent. (29) For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy,
bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
(Prf:30) Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
retained. (31) For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for
us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.
(Prf:32) In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of
human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that which
we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type.
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