(5) Neither
can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.
(6) For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a
greater to a less perfection - in other words, it is an activity whereby
a man's power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. [xi] note).
(E3:7) I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy,
and grief,. because these terms are generally used in reference to the
body, and are merely kinds of pleasure and pain.
[De.IV] Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept
in question has no connection with other concepts
(cf. [lii] & Note).
Explanation.- (E4:1) In the note to II:[xviii] we showed the reason, why
the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls to the
contemplation of another thing, namely, because the images of the two
things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the other.
(2) This state of association is impossible, if the image of the thing
be new; the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof,
until it is determined by other causes to think of something else.
(E4:3) Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is of
the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include wonder
among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include it, inasmuch
as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing
away the mind from other objects, but merely, from the absence of a
cause, which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation
of one object to the contemplation of another.
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