II:[xxiii] ) it
would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite.
(E1:6) Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it
was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined by some given
modification, &c. (7) For, by a modification of man's essence, we
understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition
be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly,
it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. (E1:8) By the
term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites,
and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are,
therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn
in different directions, and knows not where to turn.
[De.II] Pleasure is the transition of a man from a
less to a greater perfection.
[De.III] Pain is the transition of a man from a
greater to less perfection.
Explanation.- (E3:1) I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
itself. (2) For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes,
he would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. (3) This
appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion, pain.
(E3:4) No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less
perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be
pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.
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