(2) But the
mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II:[xl] note 2). (3) Therefore,
it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in
so far as it is active ([i] ). (58:4) Again, the mind, both in so
far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused
ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being ([ix] ); but by such
an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore,
desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or
([i] ) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
Prop. [LIX] Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
active, there are none which cannot be referred to
pleasure or desire.
Proof.- (59:1) All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or pain,
as their definitions, already given, show. (2) Now by pain we mean that
the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked ([xi] ¬e);
therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of understanding,
that is, of activity, is diminished or checked ([i] ); therefore, no
painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being
active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.
Note.- (59:3) All actions following from emotion, which are attributable
to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of
character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and
highmindedness (generositas).
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