(11) For temperance,
sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury,
drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate
a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. (12) However,
I cannot here explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they
are as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be
necessary. (56:13) It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine
the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a
general definition of each emotion. (14) It is sufficient, I repeat, to
understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable
us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating
and checking the emotions. (56:15) Thus, though there is a great
difference between various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for
instance between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a
wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences,
or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.
Prop. [LVII] Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
emotion of another individual, only in so far as the
essence of the one individual differs from the essence
of the other.
Proof.- (57:1) This proposition is evident from II:[A.viii] .
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