vii] ) be
perceived through itself without anything else. (2) If, therefore, we
conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore
([xiii] note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost
love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. (49:3) But if the
thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we
shall then (by the same I:[D.vii] ) conceive it not as the sole cause, but
as one of the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
towards it will be less. Q.E.D.
Note.- (49:4) Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be free,
feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards anything else:
to this consideration we must add the imitation of emotions treated of
in [xxvii] , [xxxiv] , [xl] , and [xliii] .
Prop. [L] Anything whatever can be, accidentally,
a cause of hope or fear.
Proof.- (50:1) This proposition is proved in the same way as [xv] ,
which see, together with [xviii] note.
Note.- (50:2) Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear
are called good or evil omens. (3) Now, in so far as such omens are the
cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear
given in [xviii] note) the causes also of pleasure and pain;
consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred, and
endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which we hope for,
or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that which we fear.
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