(47:8) For when men conceive a danger, they
conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it; this
determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom, which became
associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom: this
renders them secure afresh: therefore they, rejoice afresh.
Prop. [XLVIII] Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former,
or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be
associated with the idea of another cause: and will
be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter
to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
Proof.- (48:1) This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love and
hatred ([xiii] note). (2) For pleasure is called love towards Peter,
and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in so far as Peter is
regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other. (3) When this condition
of causality is either wholly or partly removed, the emotion towards Peter
also wholly or in part vanishes. Q.E.D.
Prop. [XLIX] Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive
to be free, must, other conditions being similar,
be greater than if it were felt towards a thing
acting by necessity.
Proof.- (49:1) A thing which we conceive as free must (I:[D.
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