(2) For in so far
as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
we ourselves feel pain.
Note.- (47:3) This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to
II:[xvii] . (4) Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually,
exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the same
manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing is strong,
a man is determined to regard it with pain; this determination, while the
image of the thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance
of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the said
determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury
done to what we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of
hatred. (47:5) For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in
question is aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it
determines the man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont
to do, when it actually did exist. (6) However, since he has joined to the
image of the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices afresh as
often as the repetition takes place. (7) This is the cause of men's
pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dangers from
which they have escaped.
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